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21–24 May 2013, IAEA, Vienna: International Experts Meeting on Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP

Analysis of events related to human and organizational factors using different coding systems



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http://clearinghouse-oef.jrc.ec.europa.eu/





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- 2. OEF and Coding the events
- 3. Evolution in attribution of causes
- 4. Human Factor Analysis and Classification System
- 5. Comparison of HFACS and IRS coding
- 6. Conclusions and recommendations



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IET – Petten/Ispra, The Netherlands/Italy (mmission)

- Institute for Energy
Staff: ≅ 275 in Petten





- Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements

Staff: **≅** 345



ITU - Karlsruhe/Ispra Germany/Italy

- Institute for Transuranium elements Staff: ≈ 325 in Karlsruhe





- Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen
- Institute for Health and Consumer Protectic
- Institute for Environment and Sustainability Staff: ≅ 425, 320, 450




IPTS - Seville Spain

- Institute for Prospective Technological Studies

Staff:

170

Total staff: ~ 2500 people





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"Nuclear Reactor Safety Assessment Unit (NRSA)" M. Bièth

NURAM G. Pascal

- Modelling of Severe Accidents
- Source Term Evaluation
- Support to DG ENER
- NUGENIA

SINSAC B. Farrar

- INSC
- PHARE-IPA
- Support to DG DEVCO
- Support to DG ELARG

NUSAC B. Zerger

- Clearinghouse (OEF)
- Safety operation of NPPs
- Support to DG ENER

Support to the EU "Stress Tests" for NPPs

Joint Research Centre



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European Clearinghouse on OEF

Members: all the nuclear regulators of EU Member States having NPPs and Switzerland

International cooperation through IAEA and OECD/NEA



EU Clearinghouse meeting 2013 03 06



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Activities of the EU Clearinghouse (1)

- Technical & scientific work
 - Background Research.
 - Trend analysis of OEF Databases
 - Topical Operational Experience Reports
 - Support on specific OEF-related needs of CH members
- Improvement of the communication on OEF between the members
 - Web site + Data Base
 - Review of draft IRS reports
 - OEF newsletter
- 3. International cooperation
- 4. Training of experts in RCA and event investigation



1. Introduction


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Activities of the EU CH (2)

1. 3 Scientific – Technical Reports;

2. 11 Topical Operational Experience Reports:

- Shika NPP criticality event of 18 June 1999
- Forsmark NPP event of 25 July 2006
- Maintenance events
- Operational experience related to nuclear fuel
- Construction & Commissioning events
- Loss of safety-classified electrical equipment due to generator high voltage peak (Olkiluoto 1, Forsmark 2)
- Supply of NPP components
- Plant Modifications
- Events related to Ageing
- External events
- Decommissioning









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Activities of the EU CH (3)







- 2. OEF and Coding the events
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Is the OEF system efficient enough?

- Numbers of annual events are not decreasing;
- Large scale accidents continue to happen;
- Are the similar events reported?
- Are analyses of previous events performed accurately?
- Is it problem to establish effective corrective action plans?
- Are the Human and Organisational errors adequately addressed?
- Is the previous experience used?
- Is the others experience used?...





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Why OEF isn't efficient enough?

- Relevant OE information does not exist or is inacurate due to weak event analyses;
- Correct OE information exists but is not accessible;
- No attempts were made to find existing info;
- Measures based on the lessons learned from the analogous event were inadequate or were not implemented adequately or on time...






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What to do?

 The causes of analysed events must be well defined (the crucial step in whole process),

and then

 actions aimed to prevent future events can be efficiently defined.





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What to do?

 Right information have to be transferred to stakeholders,

but in the forest of information

 we need good event database system to simplify retrieving and use of information.


The major contributor to quality of event DB system is **good coding system**.





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Evolution in attribution of causes




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Evolution in attribution of causes: IRS reports




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Evolution in attribution of causes: IRS reports

IRS database Human Causal Factors




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Evolution in attribution of causes: IRS reports

IRS database Organisational Causal Factors





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Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS): main principles


- 1.Incidents/accidents usually are caused by human errors which take root with the decisions made by those at the top of the organization which in turn affect inferior managers, supervisors and personnel who perform day-to-day operations.
- 2.Analysis of events in HFACS is starting from unsafe acts of individuals and then is being continued upwards to the top through five hierarchical levels of management system, examining preconditions of the unsafe acts and identifying latent organizational failures and deficiencies of management.





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
Methodology





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






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
Methodology





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Methodology






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
Results

Distribution of causal factors of events

European

Commission





IRS

HFACS-NE






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Distribution of human performance related CF according to IRS






% from total number of human performance related CF

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Distribution of management and equipment related CF according to IRS










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Results

HFACS-NE analysis: unsafe acts



% from total number of unsafe acts






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Results HFACS-NE

% from total number of CF related to preconditions

Preconditions of unsafe acts



% from total number of preconditions for unsafe acts






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Results HFACS-NE

Deficiencies in leadership/supervision






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Results HFACS-NE

Organizational/senior management deficiencies



% from the total number of organizational/senior management deficiencies

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Conclusions

- 1. Practices of nuclear events investigations are not enough focused on identification of latent root causes, related to HOF/management.
- 2. Role of management in the events related to HOF often is underestimated and even misunderstood.
- 3.Coding system of events submitted to IRS does not facilitate easy categorization of HOF/ management related causal factors and needs to be improved.
- 4.HFACS seems to be suitable for in-depth examination and comprehensive coding of influences created by HOF and management at different levels.

- 2. OEF and Coding the events
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Recommendations

To improve the effectiveness of OEF in general and quality of IRS reports specifically:

- Human performance engineering or HOF specialists should be included in the event investigation teams;
- Event investigation methodologies and causal factors coding systems should be re-oriented to deeper organizational analysis of management impacts on individuals' performance;
- Level of independency of investigation should be increased, at least by including independent experts in the investigation team.
- The corrective actions and improvements should be based on reliable root cause analysis results but not on guesses and assumptions.

